



## Recreational Pilot e-zine

Issue 163  
July 2021

### RAANZ 2021 Roadshows

## Matamata Airfield Soaring Centre clubrooms Saturday August 14 1000-1400 (approx)

- Human factors to consider during flight training and flying.
- Entering and remaining in the on-condition program.
- Aircraft ownership responsibilities.
- Aircraft logbooks and their use.
- General Q&A session.

**Open to ALL pilots, owners, instructors, IAs**

### Different Accident, No Lesson

Reprinted from Avweb /Paul Bertorelli



Over the weekend, a highly experienced skydiver acquaintance of mine died in an accident that was, for all intents and purposes, the equivalent of last week's mid-air collision in Colorado. It was a mid-air canopy collision that the other skydiver survived.

This news reached me on Sunday morning as I was thinking about the Centennial mid-air and watching comments scroll by on social media suggesting there's much to learn from the Colorado accident. I can be as thick as a mud fence sometimes, but I can't think of single thing to learn from either of these mishaps, other than if you lose the bubble in a high-risk environment, you can die in an instant. But did we not already know this? Is this now some kind of Eureka moment?

We published [this news story](#) the day the accident occurred and a couple of days later, Juan Browne pulled together a nice summary on his [YouTube channel](#). He's got the fact pattern well illuminated and absent the NTSB's investigation, the results of which we probably won't see for months and with no probable cause for three years, you can readily see what happened here. And see it well enough to draw your own conclusions.

Do we not, by now, know that when entering a traffic pattern, we have to be hyper alert for other traffic? Is this a new awareness? Raise your hand if you didn't know that the second part of see and avoid is not to hit the traffic you say you have in sight. (The tape has the Cirrus pilot saying he had the ATC-pointed-out traffic in sight, the airplane he eventually collided with.) Is it news to anyone that a visual tower just provides sequencing and point outs, but not separation? Do people who've actually passed a checkride understand—or at least remember—that the faster the airplane is flying, the larger its turn radius will be? And that's one reason you slow down in the pattern? As this accident is dissected, will further flaying of the thing tell us something we haven't seen a thousand times before?

If the answer to these questions is no, our training edifice is even more rickety than I imagined. But increasingly, the more I cover and write about accidents, the less effective I think that coverage is in preventing the next one because we're not seeing much new in how people wreck airplanes. How they die doing it. That may not be equally true of the *why*, but I suspect not much has changed there, either. We continue to implore pilots not to do certain things in the interest of accident avoidance or to do other things in the same pursuit, but, despite a lower accident rate, some of us keep doing and not doing the same things anyway. I wonder if we delude ourselves into believing we can procedureilize our way to a lower accident rate.

What may actually be needed is training in thinking about *thinking* instead of thinking about flying. Back to the skydiving connection. I jumped on Saturday and had a minor revelation. At the end of the free-fall part of a jump, we track off to gain some separation for canopy deployment. After the canopy is out, there's 10 seconds of housekeeping: collapse the slider; open the chest strap; slide back in the leg straps; release the brakes. For years, it has been my habit to look around for my team-mates immediately before and after doing this. I hold the rear risers in case I need a quick avoidance turn. My team-mates are likely to be hundreds of feet away, but we all like to confirm that and that everyone is under a good canopy. It's just basic survival situational awareness. It's habitual.

After the third jump Saturday, I realized I hadn't done this all day. And I couldn't remember when I *stopped* doing it. This is complacency setting in and it's what kills people in any high-risk endeavour. I had lost the habitual discipline on which survival turns. I wasn't paying attention to the hierarchy of risk in the various phases of a risky activity. That I thought about it snapped me out of it.

In flying—especially in a modern airplane—your eyes can't be outside the cockpit constantly, nor do they need to be. Given that the majority of mid-air happen in the traffic pattern and there are between six and eight mid-air a year, the risk away from the airport justifies a more relaxed scan. You'd exhaust yourself to dysfunction if you didn't fly with relaxed awareness some of the time. Approaching the airport, however, the reverse is true. There's little or no time for anything but eyes outside; not using ADS-B to find traffic you should acquire visually, because visually is how you're going to avoid it. And not relying on a tower for accurate point outs or blabbering on the

radio in the misguided belief that it's anything other than a supplement to a pair of vigilant eyes.

Do people not have this sense of elevated risk? I think they know it intuitively and have it reinforced in training. Maybe what we need is to figure out not how to beat more specific procedures and memory tasks into pilots, but how to get them to self-diagnose complacency to keep it from eroding basic survival awareness. In other words, we all know what to do to confront the risks; we just have to know when we're faced with them.

If I figure that out, I'll let you know.

## Incident report

Hi Stuart.

I had an unfortunate experience last Saturday.

Bryn at Leading Edge Aviation (the repairer) suggested I copy you the CAA005 I sent to CAA.

There was an AD out to replace the leg at or before the next annual. (03-10-21)

Vans haven't been able to supply the new nose wheel leg, so just my luck! (see attached)

Thanks

Regards

Bernard Lewis

## Occurrence Report



Complete unshaded areas only where applicable. Post or email to CAA as soon as possible.  
To report an accident or serious incident phone: 0508 ACCIDENT (0508 222 433) Monitored 24 hours a day, seven days a week.  
To report other safety or security concerns phone: 0508 4SAFETY (0508 472 338) Available office hours (voice mail after hours).  
Then post or email this form to [isi@caa.govt.nz](mailto:isi@caa.govt.nz)

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY  
OF NEW ZEALAND  
Te Mana Kereerangi Tūmatanui o Aotearoa

### Reporter's Details

Name **BERNARD LEWIS** Position **OWNER**  
Organisation **RAANZ** Reporter's Client ID **5150**  
Date **27-02-21** Telephone **027 544 6595** Email **bernard.lewis@xtar.co.nz**  
Reporter's Ref number \_\_\_\_\_ Reporter's Investigation ☐ Open OR ☐ Closed  
Number of attachments (if any) **4**

### Occurrence Details

Date of occurrence **20-02-21** Time **11:00 AM** ☐ NZST ☒ NZDT ☐ UTC Location **PARAKI AIRFIELD**  
Aircraft registration **ZK - YRV** Aircraft Make and Model **VANS RV12**  
Operator Name **BERNARD LEWIS** Operator Client ID \_\_\_\_\_  
Persons on Board **2** Number of injuries - Fatal ☐ Crew ☐ Pax ☐ Serious ☐ Crew ☐ Pax ☐ Minor ☐ Crew ☐ Pax

### Description of Occurrence

**NOSE WHEEL LEG COLLAPSE TURNING 90° LH IN TAXIWAY.**  
**SPEED: 0 → WALKING SPEED**



Date Released:  
 Date Effective:  
 Subject:  
 Affected Models: Affected Serial Numbers:  
 Required Action:  
 Time of Compliance:  
 14401 Keil Road NE, Aurora, Oregon, USA 97002 PHONE 503-678-6545 • FAX 503-678-6560  
[www.vansaircraft.com](http://www.vansaircraft.com) • [info@vansaircraft.com](mailto:info@vansaircraft.com)  
 SERVICE BULLETIN 19-08-26  
 January 27, 2020  
 January 31, 2020 – applicability clarifications added  
 January 27, 2020  
 WD-1201 Nose gear leg replacement  
 All RV-12/RV-12iS with finish kits shipped before 06-10-19  
 SLSA RV-12/RV-12iS aircraft with serial numbers 12080 and earlier  
 Replace WD-1201 with WD-1201-1-RTR Nose Gear At or before the next annual condition inspection  
 Labor Required / SLSA Warranty Allowance: 7.0 hours  
 Level of Certification: S-LSA: LSA Repairman - Maintenance or A&P  
 E-LSA/EAB: Aircraft Owner  
 Synopsis: An RV-12 training aircraft with more than 1700 hours of accumulated flight time recently experienced a nose gear fatigue failure. This is the only reported instance; no other fatigue-related nose gear failures have been reported. The failure occurred in the nose gear leg at the point where the leg tube meets the lower attachment bracket, and was caused by a fatigue crack that propagated across the tube. The crack occurred at a location that is not visually inspectable. It is, therefore, strongly recommended that owners of RV-12/RV-12iS aircraft with the original style nose gear leg (WD-1201) replace that part with the available updated, reinforced leg - part number WD-1201-1.  
 NOTE: Only original WD-1201 legs, which were shipped prior to June 10th, 2019, are affected by this service bulletin. If you have received a WD-1201-1 gear leg since that time either with your kit or as a backorder item, it is not affected.  
 NOTE: In addition, only if your RV-12 or RV-12iS is currently under construction, and you received your finishing kit prior to June 10, 2019, and you have not yet completed the following steps in your plans, please contact Van's Aircraft to order a replacement gear leg rather than ordering the retrofit kits listed below.  
 • RV-12iS: Section 46iS-05, Steps 1-7  
 • Original RV-12: Section 46-08, Steps 1-3  
 If you have already completed those steps, please follow the instructions that appear starting on the next page.  
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## Defect report- ICP Savannah S

### Defect Details

Microlight type/model	ICP Savannah S (factory build)		
Total Time in Service (hrs)	160.4		
Defect area	Airframe/Engine/Controls/Flying surfaces/Undercarriage/etc		
Describe the defect	On start up the oil pressure did not come up at all 16 Oct, engine shut down immediately. Engineer notified. Engineer inspects aircraft confirms problem, suspects Mocal OT/1 temperature control.		
Describe the affect on airworthiness	Mocal OT/1 failed. These units are only supplied on the factory built ASTM approved LSA Savannah S. Research shows that the unit is designed to open at 80 degrees but can be configured to open at 92 degrees. The aircraft during normal operating conditions never went above about 90 degrees (below the 100 degrees recommended during every flight -Rotax Service Instruction SI-18-1997).		
Remedial action taken	Have removed the Mocal unit and the ICP metal oil hosing as this is also of a substandard quality and have replumbed using Rotax rubber hosing. Replacement Mocal unit can be found online for \$92 AUD or from Philip Seale (ICP NZ Agent) for \$350 + GST. However, a more fit for purpose (Thermostasis) will be installed. The unit is on order.		

## To the editor of Recpilot e-zine

Having read your defect report (Jabiru J160 ethanol fuel) I would like for you to consider a title change to something like this.

### **Defect report...Pilot defect... not reading the Pilot Operating Manual, section 7.16 page 85 and 8.8 page 102**

It is very clear that this fuel should not be used in a Jabiru. This is not a Jabiru problem.

I would like this to be using diesel in a Rotax to save a few dollars and then blaming the motor or plane!

Chickens do have an ability to come home to roost.

## Membership changes

Brendon Marshall	Canterbury Recreational Aircraft Club	Advanced National	Upgrade
Kanoj Boouodira	Waikato Microlight Club	Novice	Exam
Neville Stirling	Fiordland Aero Club	Advanced National	Upgrade
Sam Boal	Geraldine Flying Group	Advanced Local	Upgrade
Keith Margan	NZ Autogyro Association	Advanced National	Upgrade
Andrew Simpson	Wairarapa Aero Club	Advanced Local	Exam
Paul Hyde-Smith	Canterbury Recreational Aircraft Club	Novice	Exam
Andrew McAllister	Canterbury Recreational Aircraft Club	Advanced National	Upgrade
Paul Graveling	Gyrat Flying Club	Advanced National	Upgrade
John Lawson	Stratford Sport Fliers Club	Novice	Exam
Blake McCurrie	Auckland Recreational Microlight Aircraft Club	Novice	Exam
Mark Ian Mackay Thompson	Matamata Aero Club	Novice	Exam
Glenn Douglas Campbell	Hawkes Bay and East Coast Aero Club	Advanced National	Joined
Lachlan McPhail	Canterbury Recreational Aircraft Club	Novice	Joined
Stephen Morgan	Canterbury Recreational Aircraft Club	Novice	Exam
Ian Hill	Canterbury Recreational Aircraft Club	Novice	Exam
Harris Atkinson	West Coast Microlight Club	Novice	Joined
John McLeod	Canterbury Recreational Aircraft Club	Novice	Joined
Ross Biggar	Feilding Flying Club	Novice	Joined
Martin Marsh	Feilding Flying Club	Novice	Joined
Sam Daly	Feilding Flying Club	Novice	Joined